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An Ontological Politics of Comparative
Environmental Analysis: The Green
Economy and Local Diversity
•
Tim Forsyth and Les Levidow
Abstract
This article contributes to comparative environmental politics by integrating comparative
analysis with debates about ontological politics as well as science and technology studies.
Comparative environmental analysis makes two tacit assumptions: that the subject of
comparison (e.g., an environmental policy framework) is mobile and can be detached
from its contexts; and that studying this subject in more than one location can identify its
diffusion and implementation anywhere. These assumptions are sites of ontological pol-
itics by predetermining (or restricting) environmental outcomes. Environmental analysis
needs to consider how its own comparative acts might reify supposedly global frame-
works rather than acknowledging how different localities appropriate and give meaning
to them in diverse ways. The concept of civic epistemologies illustrates how domestic
politics are organized around supposedly global concepts, rather than how global con-
cepts diffuse around the world, as illustrated here by a comparative analysis of the United
Nations’ Green Economy Initiative.
There is an old story about two monks watching a ﬂag blowing in the breeze.
The ﬁrst monk says, “The ﬂag is moving.” The second replies, “The wind is mov-
ing.” A passing abbot intervenes, “It is not the ﬂag, nor the wind, but your mind
that moves.”
Comparative environmental analysis can be somewhat like the monks’
story. In order for comparison to identify similar or different outcomes of an
environmental policy framework, it must distinguish between ﬂags and wind
through a multi-step methodology. First, it needs to identify a subject that
can be analyzed at a distance. Second, the subject has to be geopolitically mo-
bile, i.e., having various states of existence in different locations. And third, the
subject has to be separable from (or independent of ) local contexts in order to
reveal relationships between the global subject and different contexts where it
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occurs. Comparative environmental analysis therefore depends on dual assump-
tions about mobility—the extent to which the subject can be detached from and
circulate between contexts—and representation—the ability to know when the
subject exists, separately from its context.
We argue that these implicit assumptions warrant critical scrutiny because
comparative environmental analysis often confuses ﬂags and wind. In other
words, comparisons often look for the existence of speciﬁc, pre-deﬁned environ-
mental subjects in different locations, while missing how local contexts deﬁne
and drive diverse pathways to widely varying outcomes. These local outcomes
can be very different from the supposedly global subject under comparison, but
are still used to demonstrate the mobility of that subject. Comparative environ-
mental analysis needs clarity about what is being compared; how and by whom
this is identiﬁed; and how some comparative approaches may hide these ques-
tions. Such scrutiny and clarity are necessary for extending the past insights
of comparative analysis within political science.
To discuss this dilemma, we draw upon growing debates about ontologi-
cal politics and apply them to the United Nations’ Green Economy Initiative.
Ontological politics has been deﬁned as “conﬂicts involving different assump-
tions about ‘what exists’”1 and has been discussed within social science in recent
years, largely complementing debates within science and technology studies
(STS). As we will show, ontological politics draws attention to the implicit
politics by which comparative environmental analysis deﬁnes its subject or
marshals evidence for subjects. We consider this theme by asking how compar-
ative environmental analysis might—in effect—reify concepts that appear global
but have sufﬁcient differences in different localities to question whether they
can be called global. Using the analogy of the monks’ story, various researchers
point to the growth of the Green Economy Initiative in different countries, but
perhaps they are seeing the ﬂag of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) ﬂying around the world, rather than local winds, or the mindsets that
emphasize ﬂags over wind.
To overcome these challenges, we draw from STS debates about how con-
cepts circulate between contexts. In particular, we argue that one common
means of analyzing circulation—actor network theory—needs to be tempered
by an analysis of how localities appropriate and give meaning to global frame-
works rather than simply adopting frameworks as though they are mobile and
detached from contexts. To ﬁll this gap, we use the alternative concepts of co-
production and civic epistemologies to demonstrate culturally speciﬁc ways of
knowing through which localities or contexts identify their own paths to envi-
ronmental outcomes, rather than adopt a freely circulating concept that is often
the subject of comparative environmental politics.2 Instead, we aim to show
how comparison itself, without due consideration, can reify the appearance of
1. Blaser 2013, 547.
2. Jasanoff 2005, 255; Miller 2008; also see Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 4.
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mobility and reduce attention to different (and possibly more important) local
responses and meanings given to environmental policy.
The Allure of Comparative Environmental Analysis
As a ﬁeld, global environmental politics commonly focuses on how environmen-
tal regimes form, and accordingly on the relative progress of different nation-
states or territories in adopting environmental policies. Mark Purdon notes in
his introduction to this special issue that comparative environmental analysis
can help “open the black box” of domestic politics to help us understand differ-
ent drivers of national governments’ willingness to participate in global policy.3
Comparative environmental analysis can also indicate the diversity of
responses to global environmental challenges. Steinberg and VanDeveer, for
example, note:
Systematic comparisons of domestic environmental politics allow us to
move beyond ill-deﬁned exhortations to “save the planet” toward a greater
understanding of the vast array of social responses to environmental prob-
lems in diverse countries around the globe.4
Indeed, they go on to state that comparative environmental analysis helps to
“gain insights into the cause-and-effect relationships that lead states and social
actors to practice or ignore environmental stewardship.”5 But what is assumed
about the latter concept?
Another well-cited example of cross-national comparison of environmen-
tal values by Dunlap and York6 analyzed how different countries were adopting
post-materialist values to indicate progress towards environmental policy. The
research asked respondents questions such as whether they approved of ecolog-
ical or nature movements, whether they would pay more taxes to prevent envi-
ronmental damage, and if they believed protecting the environment should be
prioritized over economic growth. The authors concluded:
[E]nvironmental activism in [developing] countries is often reﬂective of
widespread public sentiment. Clearly, both environmental activism and
public support for environmental protection have become global phenom-
ena and are no longer—if they ever were—limited to the wealthy nations of
the world.7
Despite the scholarship of these studies, they beg important questions. They
do not explore who deﬁnes or legitimizes visions of “environmental stewardship.”
3. Purdon, this issue, citing Victor 2011, 8.
4. Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 29.
5. Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 29.
6. Dunlap and York 2008, 2012.
7. Dunlap and York 2012, 108.
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Similarly, by asking simply about public support for “ecological values,” the ques-
tion neglects how these may have various forms within and/or across contexts; the
same holds true for various forms of “economic growth.” As in this study by
Dunlap and York, comparative analysis has been used to illustrate and explain
the dissemination of environmental values as “global phenomena.” However,
the various ways in which values can be deﬁned—and the diversity of pathways
to achieve them—seem to be hidden unwittingly in the overall objective to dem-
onstrate optimism about environmental values spreading around the world.
Ontology and Globalizing Assumptions
Our critical questions above raise concerns about the ontological politics at play
by referring to conﬂicts about how “environment” or “ecological values” are
deﬁned by actors, generally in tacit ways. Comparative environmental analysis
often keeps the differences tacit, through ontological assumptions about a geo-
politically mobile subject (as above) and/or through insufﬁcient attention to its
diverse forms, when representing environmental outcomes in different contexts
around the world.
These challenges demonstrate what STS debates call co-production:
knowledge generation occurring simultaneously with visions of social order
(and vice versa).8 Co-production can demonstrate how social values inﬂuence
what is identiﬁed and measured as appropriate (environmental) performance. It
can also be used to analyze how frameworks of environmental analysis can sep-
arate those outcomes from local contexts.
One early analysis of co-production within global environmental politics
focused on the assumptions underlying the 1972 Limits To Growth report, which
ominously predicted, “Short of a world effort… the outcome can only be disas-
ter.”9 However, according to co-productionist analysis, this outcome could only
be projected by assuming that citizens around the world adopt a “rational
choice” response to resource scarcity, such as competing for resources or failing
to adopt means of mitigating consumption. Accordingly, this analysis argued
that the Limits To Growthmodel could only co-exist with a parallel (but implicit)
model of individual behavior—which was not justiﬁed by research on social
behavior in different locations.10
Another early co-productionist analysis was Agarwal and Narain’s famous
criticism of the World Resources Institute’s assertion that China, India, and
Brazil were among the top six countries responsible for anthropogenic climate
change, on the grounds of current rates of fossil-fuel use and deforestation.11
The authors argued for the consideration of other aspects: per capita energy
8. Jasanoff 2004.
9. Meadows et al 1972, 195.
10. Taylor and Buttel 1992.
11. Agarwal and Narain 1991, criticizing WRI 1990.
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use, historic deforestation, and whether fuels are used for livelihoods or high-
consuming lifestyles. This study demonstrated the principle of co-production by
showing how supposedly neutral cross-national comparisons of global climate
change policy also carry parallel (and implicit) normative assumptions about
appropriate origins of emissions, assumptions that—allegedly—overlook inter-
national inequalities in development.
STS approaches to cross-national environmental comparisons aim to iden-
tify the implicit social norms that—in turn—shape measurements of how dif-
ferent countries adhere (or not) to standards of environmental performance. So,
for example, when Keck and Sikkink claimed that international advocacy coali-
tions of environmental NGOs and campaigners in different countries allow
“ecological values to be placed above narrow deﬁnitions of national interest,”12
they pay insufﬁcient attention to what “ecological values” mean and how
completely they are accepted. Similarly, the aforementioned questions posed
by Dunlap and York imply a necessary choice between economic growth and
ecological values, thus making ontological assumptions about what both con-
cepts mean. This framework pre-empts the possibility of actors reframing the
concepts as compatible.
Comparison and Diversity
Through such blind spots, comparative environmental analysis might contrib-
ute to a normative form of cultural globalization if it seeks to analyze by com-
paring national adoption of environmental values predeﬁned in culturally
speciﬁc ways, or without sufﬁcient awareness of what alternative values are
being excluded.13 To avoid this blind spot, comparative methods need to be-
come more aware of the underlying models of mobility and representation of
environmental outcomes. How to achieve this awareness?
Within STS, actor-network theory has been used as a framework to con-
sider how concepts or “facts” circulate between contexts when the conditions that
ﬁrst identiﬁed these items are recreated at different sites. Bruno Latour,14 for ex-
ample, argued that Pasteur’s scientiﬁc experiments on anthrax changed practices
across France via the tacit assumption that progress could be made only when
the same laboratory-type conditions were replicated in distant places in the
ﬁeld. From this framework arose the concept of “immutable mobile,” i.e., an
object that remains stable between contexts because the social conditions that
uphold them are replicated in each location.15 In this sense, uncritical ap-
proaches to comparative environmental analysis implicitly look for actor net-
works that can enhance the circulation of immutable mobiles in different
contexts; evidence for them is equated with global diffusion.
12. Keck and Sikkink 1998, 215.
13. Jasanoff and Martello 2005.
14. Latour 1987.
15. Latour 1986, 12.
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The actor–network framework also contains tensions and different ap-
proaches that challenge the earlier focus on immutable mobiles. One famous
analysis of international comparisons of anemia showed that different countries
and organizations deﬁned and measured anemia very differently. Accordingly,
the international “comparison” was made coherent only because scientists
labeled these diverse measurements under the single category of “anemia.”16
By analogy, “global environmentalism” might therefore disseminate in similar
ways if diverse national pathways are labeled loosely as representing the same
transition, thus reinforcing academics’ ontological assumptions.
Moreover, actor–network theory has been criticized for prioritizing the
analysis of circulation, while neglecting how localities make and achieve their
own environmental outcomes, which might or might not be identiﬁed and
compared between contexts. According to Sheila Jasanoff:
[W]hen actor-network theory confronts the nature of power, as it often does,
it side-steps the very questions about people, institutions, ideas and prefer-
ences that are of greatest political concern. Who loses and who wins through
the constitution of networks? How are beneﬁts and burdens (re)distributed
by or across them? How willing or unwilling are participants to change their
behavior or beliefs because of their enrollment into networks?17
Pursuing the above questions, STS scholars elaborated the concept of civic
epistemologies—how localities identify and legitimize norms of behavior, as
well as making them visible within global initiatives.18 Civic epistemologies,
deﬁned as the “national cultures of rationality,”19 offer a means of identifying
local inﬂuences on environmental values or different pathways for adopting
global policies.
The relevance of civic epistemologies to comparative environmental anal-
ysis goes beyond merely cognitive aspects. As Steinberg and VanDeveer note:
“[national] variance [in environmental performance] is due in part to differ-
ences in the way that science is organized in distinct national settings.”20 Civic
epistemologies, however, emphasize the extra-cognitive, normative shaping of
environmental responses, beyond simple adherence to internationally deﬁned
standards. Crucially, civic epistemologies are also deﬁned as “the dimensions
of political order that each state seeks to immunize or hold beyond question”21
and theways bywhich “the commingling of is and ought takes place.”22 Consequently,
civic epistemologies offer insights to the variety by which different locations inter-
pret and respond to environmental policies, rather than adopting pre-deﬁned
16. Mol and Law 1994; Law 2011.
17. Jasanoff 2004, 23.
18. Daston 2000; Barry 2012.
19. Winickoff 2012, x.
20. Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 4.
21. Jasanoff 2012, 10.
22. Jasanoff 2012, 19. (Emphasis in original).
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environmental values and outcomes. These locations can be national, sub-national,
or any scale in which knowledge claims are made and contested in coherent terms.
The Green Economy Example
UNEP deﬁnes a green economy as:
[o]ne that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while
signiﬁcantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In its
simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which is
low carbon resource efﬁcient and socially inclusive.23
The Green Economy Initiative (GEI) was launched by UNEP in 2008 as a
means of integrating economic development with sustainable development. It
was based on the goal of achieving three key objectives: a new economic man-
agement to avoid the misallocation of resources; an acknowledgment that pop-
ulation growth and consumption threaten scarce resources; and a commitment
to assisting poorer and more vulnerable people, such as in developing countries.
UNEP identiﬁed ﬁve key enabling conditions for establishing a green eco-
nomy:24 to work against the implicit subsidies of underpriced resources (such
as air and water as sinks for uncosted pollution); appropriate pricing for resources
and all other inputs to an economy in order to avoid underpricing resources;
encouraging investment in resource-efﬁcient research and development; higher
levels of efﬁciency; and environmental regulation to pre-empt resource scarcity
and redirect economies away from unsustainable activities.
Various NGOS and academics have criticized the GEI, however, on the
grounds that it does not adequately transform current economic practices, leaves
intact the “brown economy” or even extends neoliberal globalization. For exam-
ple, within the GEI framework, the Natural Capital Declaration of Chief Execu-
tive Ofﬁcers from ﬁnancial companies undertook to incorporate natural capital
into their balance sheets.25 A network of civil society organizations, however,
stated that the declaration “is based upon a fatally ﬂawed understanding of
the root causes of crises (imperfect valuation of ‘Natural Capital and Ecosystem
Services’) and proposes an equally ﬂawed solution to them (proper pricing).”26
The GEI generated different international comparisons that illustrate the
implicit political challenges of comparative environmental analysis. For exam-
ple, a new global network of researchers and practitioners recently published
Green Growth in Practice: Lessons from Country Experiences, which drew lessons
from nine countries including Morocco, Kenya, Bangladesh, South Korea,
23. UNEP, available at: http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/AboutGEI/WhatisGEI/tabid/29784/
Default.aspx.
24. UNEP 2011, 22–23.
25. BankTrack 2012; IISD 2012, 8.
26. BankTrack 2012. See also Bina 2013; Brand 2012a and b; Fuentes-George 2013; Mirowski 2013.
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Singapore, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, and the USA.27 Although the report refers
to “green growth,” the links with the GEI are clear: “Green growth is becoming
an attractive opportunity for countries around the world to achieve poverty re-
duction, environmental protection, resource efﬁciency and economic growth in
an integrated way.”28
Although implying various national means towards the same objective,
the report indicates the diversity of pathways adopted.29 For example, “China
has committed to green growth in its 12th Five Year Plan. Actions include in-
vesting in natural resource management, with the aim of creating one million
new forestry jobs and reducing rural poverty.” By contrast, “Korea has adopted a
green growth strategy to drive economic competitiveness through development
and use of advanced technologies. The government is investing in innovation
and deployment programs for 27 priority technologies, guided by a Green Tech-
nology Roadmap with the goal of becoming the world’s seventh largest eco-
nomy by 2020.” The Japanese government created a comprehensive strategy
focused on four areas: green, life, agriculture, and small and medium enter-
prises. Japan thereby aims to “construct a resilient and adaptable socioeconomy
and demonstrate model solutions to the world by addressing energy constraints
and an aging society; and build local communities driven by individuals and
entrepreneurs supported by local agriculture to reap the beneﬁts of a new kind
of growth.”
A comparative analysis requires asking some difﬁcult questions: How
(much) do any of these objectives demonstrate a distinctive shift from pre-
existing national technological and social policies in these countries? Is all this
a gradual diffusion of the GEI to different countries around the world? Or is this
an optical illusion, based on how governments and expert agencies write reports
about the green economy? As in the monks’ story, it is important to consider the
extent to which evidence depends on the eye of the beholder.
In terms of evaluating evidence, consider this example:
Ethiopia used a broad analytic framework for assessing green growth beneﬁts.
An Integrated Assessment Model was used for macro-economic impact such
as the loss of GDP from climate change impacts in the agriculture and energy
sectors. The beneﬁts (and costs) of each option were assessed using multiple
criteria that ranged from economic cost-beneﬁt ratios, to qualitative assess-
ments of the beneﬁts for biodiversity and poverty reduction. A relatively basic
spreadsheet-based analysis was used to assess sector speciﬁc beneﬁts.30
Does this description suggest that evidence of green growth in Ethiopia
was the work of an enterprising analyst in front of a computer, rather than tran-
sitions in economic investments and behavior? Other examples of “national”
27. GGBP 2014.
28. GGBP 2014.
29. All citations are from GGBP 2014, 13–23.
30. GGBP 2014, 19.
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progress seemed based on individual projects rather than new national policies.
For example, the report cites the example of a World Bank funded watershed
management project in Karnataka, India, which “employed a systems approach,
with a focus on soil and water conservation and sustainable resource use, and
used participatory planning and implementation to improve local livelihoods,
gender equity, and community capacity.”31
Another study compared the GEI inMalawi, Mozambique, and South Africa.
Echoing the concerns of Agarwal and Narain, this study argued that a literal
adoption of the GEI would reduce the opportunities for these countries to gain
economic competitive advantage—by restricting local development of fossil fuel
deposits—but would also “generate substantial domestic resistance, especially
among the poor.”32 For example, in South Africa in 2001, coal supplied 81 per-
cent of installed electricity capacity but 94 percent of total domestic demand
because of the low load-bearing capacities of renewable energy.33 In Malawi,
there was popular and government resistance to the GEI proposal to end sub-
sidies on agriculture fertilizers, considered essential to local food security.34
In Mozambique biofuel from the jatropha plant has been promoted as an
opportunity to employ unskilled labor and reduce dependency on imported oil,
but it might also increase deforestation because it requires greater disturbance of
currently unplanted land. By contrast, ethanol from sugar cane offers higher en-
ergy production but less scope for hiring unskilled labor. It is therefore unclear
how green growth can achieve its combined objectives of alleviating poverty
and reducing environmental degradation.35 Such choices are further complicated
by plantation-scale biofuel development, which diverts scarce water from food
crops, as criticized by local NGOs.36
These observations highlight that cross-national comparisons have asked
mainly to what extent different countries have adopted the GEI as a central, al-
legedly transferable framework, but the analysis can be read instead as diverse
pathways to different outcomes. (Indeed, it can also indicate local concerns about
the GEI framework). Taking this comparative analysis at face value implies that
the GEI is a globally mobile, comparable outcome—contrary to its great diversity.
It also implies that progress can be identiﬁed by measuring its adoption, thus
obscuring the normative criteria and accountabilities driving its local versions.
Conclusions
Comparative environmental analysis can be a powerful explanatory tool and in
turn a political tool to pursue better futures. But such analysis also can be blind,
31. GGBP 2014, 27.
32. Resnick et al 2012, 215.
33. Resnick et al 2012, 219.
34. Resnick et al 2012, 222.
35. Resnick et al 2012, 216.
36. Friends of the Earth International 2010.
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by conﬂating movement of a ﬂag, the wind, and the mind of the beholder. We
argue that comparative environmental analysis should consider how far the act
of comparison itself can reify supposedly global concepts as mobile, transfer-
able frameworks—rather than see how localities appropriate or give meanings
to these and other environmental frameworks. Comparative environmental
analysis therefore should not simply identify the different factors driving na-
tional or sub-national levels of participation in global environmental policies,
but also ask how the act of comparison (and the selection of evidence to
demonstrate differences) can reify or hide how different localities identify and
respond to environmental initiatives.
Comparative environmental analysis can reify or hide diversity in environ-
mental activities and perceptions through a tacit process of ontological politics.
These politics exist in two tacit assumptions: that the subject of comparison
(such as an environmental policy framework) can be detached from its context;
and that studying this subject in more than one location can identify its diffu-
sion and implementation anywhere. These ontological assumptions predeter-
mine (or restrict) the deﬁnition of appropriate environmental outcomes, thus
missing how local contexts deﬁne and drive diverse pathways to widely varying
outcomes. Local outcomes can be very different than the supposedly global sub-
ject under comparison, but the reasons these local responses are different can be
ignored if the objective of comparison is to demonstrate the mobility of the
main subject of comparative analysis. While many proponents of comparative
environmental politics argue that this style of analysis aims precisely to identify
local drivers for policy, we cite examples of comparative analysis of environ-
mental values and the GEI that have compressed local differences into alleged
evidence for the mobility of concepts.37 We identify such blindspots and pro-
posed a framework for avoiding them, as a basis for realizing the beneﬁts of
comparative environmental politics.
Comparison itself contains various ontological politics. This is a slightly
different understanding from that of Steinberg and VanDeveer, who proposed
that comparative environmental politics (or analysis) is a positive collaboration
between “those concerned with the fate of the planet and its people and those
engaged in the comparative study of political life.”38 In contrast, we argue that
comparative environmental analysis (or comparative environmental politics) is
not an allocation of labor between political scientists (who do the comparison)
and environmentalists (who provide the concern about the planet). Rather, we
need to see how knowledge, concern, and analysis are produced together. STS
scholars have labeled this association co-production—or the mutual creation
of knowledge with visions of social order.39 Comparative analysis can inadver-
tently hide ontological differences in how localities conceptualize “the environ-
ment,” its protection, their own responsibilities, etc. As an example of such
37. E.g., Dunlap and York 2008; GGBP 2014.
38. Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 30.
39. Jasanoff, 2004.
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differences, the GEI has taken diverse national forms, but despite the claims of
comparative analysis discussed in this paper, it remains unclear whether these
countries adopted new global norms under the green economy banner, or merely
presented pre-existing activities and policies to give that appearance.
To overcome these challenges, we proposed that comparative analysis
needs to ask two additional questions: “What is” being compared? (Or, is the
subject sufﬁciently mobile to be detachable from contexts?) And by assuming
that something is mobile and comparable, are local contexts and their drivers
being hidden? The civic epistemologies framework offers means to identify the
local contexts, drivers and accountabilities whereby localities devise environ-
mental norms. This framework also focuses more upon how environmental
values and policies are contingently made, rather than simply circulate for adop-
tion (or not). In this sense, we have argued that the analysis of circulation under
actor network theory needs to be complemented by referencing co-production
and civic epistemologies. Together, the analysis of how comparison contains
tacit ontological assumptions, how localities appropriate global concepts and
how researchers or other reporters portray localities as adopting global concepts
represent tacit ontological politics. These questions warrant further investigation
within the emerging ﬁeld of comparative environmental analysis.
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